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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Alton D. Brown, an inmate at SCI-Greene, appeals from two orders denying his 
applications to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) in connection with two complaints he 
filed in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.   
 Because Brown has at least “three strikes” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), he can 
proceed IFP only if he is “under imminent danger of serious physical injury.”  § 1915(g); 
see also Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 312 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc).  In each 
case here, the Magistrate Judge determined that Brown had not shown that he was in 
imminent danger of serious physical injury, and the District Court adopted the Magistrate 
Judge’s Report and Recommendation over Brown’s objections.1  As we conclude that the 
District Court erred in determining that Brown was not under imminent danger of serious 
physical injury at the time he filed his complaints, 2 we will summarily vacate the District 
Court’s decisions and remand for further proceedings.3  
                                              
1 We granted Brown the privilege of proceeding IFP on appeal, finding that he had shown 
that he was in imminent danger of serious physical injury in his filings here.  Brown 
argues that our IFP decision is dispositive of the issues on appeal.  But we must decide 
whether the District Court abused its discretion based on the information that it had in 
making the decisions. 
 
2 There is no question that Brown qualifies financially to proceed IFP. 
 
3 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review the ruling denying IFP status, 
see Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 311 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc), and our 
review is for abuse of discretion, see Jones v. Zimmerman, 752 F.2d 76, 78 (3d Cir. 
1985).  “A district court abuses its discretion when its decision rests upon a clearly 
erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law to 
fact.”  Hagan v. Rogers, 570 F.3d 146, 152 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Summary action is appropriate when no substantial issue is raised on appeal.  
See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
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 A. D.C. Civil No. 16-cv-01081 
 The complaint that Brown sought to file in D.C. Civil No. 16-cv-01081 concerned 
his medical treatment at SCI-Greene for prostate issues.  Brown alleged that test results 
indicated that he had prostate cancer, but that the doctor suggested a prostate biopsy 
before treatment would commence.  Brown’s complaint stated that he requested the 
following in order to make an informed decision:   
(i) access to his medical record; (ii) access to his medical books; (iii) access 
to the law library computer (to conduct medical research); and (iv) 
protection from the continuous abusive attacks he had been subjected to by 
retaliating security and medical staff since his 5/11/15 incarceration at SCI-
Greene (said attacks are also partially motivated by racial hate.) 
 
Complaint at ¶ 10.  The Magistrate Judge found, and the District Court agreed, that 
Brown’s “own submissions demonstrate that he has repeatedly refused medical care 
offered by the Defendants to treat his prostate cancer,” and that it thus was Brown’s “own 
refusal to obtain treatment—and not any actions by the Defendants—that has placed 
[Brown] in ‘imminent danger.’”  Dist. Ct. Order, Dkt. #8 at 1-2. 
 We agree with the District Court that an inmate should not be able to consciously 
create the situation that places him in imminent danger.  But here, Brown alleged that he 
was refusing treatment because he is not being given enough information to allow him to 
give his informed consent.  Brown noted that “Appellees ha[ve] offered to treat the 
cancer, but first want to conduct a prostate biopsy, which is an invasive diagnostic 
procedure.”  Brown argued that he has a right under Department of Corrections policy, 
state law, and the U.S. Constitution “to such information as is reasonably necessary to 
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make an informed and prudent decision to accept or reject proposed treatment, as well as 
a reasonable explanation of the viable alternative treatments that can be made available, 
in accordance with state law and health codes, and prison rules and regulations.”  
Complaint at ¶ 23.  He alleged that he has been denied such information because of the 
Appellees’ desire to punish him on account of his litigious behavior.  As exhibits to his 
complaint and his objections to the Magistrate Judge’s report, Brown provided copies of 
several grievances he had filed in his attempts to gain access to his medical records.  He 
also complained about what he characterized as falsification of his records—although the 
records stated that he was refusing treatment, he stated that in reality he was exercising 
his right of informed consent before making a decision regarding the proposed care.  
 Brown alleged that Appellees’ failure to provide him with adequate information 
has “resulted in his inability to be treated, or make an informed decision of whether to 
accept or reject the diagnostic/treatment offered.”  Brown alleged that his condition is 
“worsening at a rapid pace,” referring to worsening Prostate-Specific Antigen (“PSA”) 
scores,4 and stated that the “cancer is causing pain, suffering, mental anguish, and stress.”  
Brown’s complaint alleged that “he has been exhibiting signs of cancer since his housing 
at SCI-Greene, including substantial and continuous weight loss, bleeding from penis and 
                                              
4 Brown’s complaint alleged that his PSA scores went from 3.69 in November 2006 
(under 4.0 is generally regarded as normal) to 11.66 in August 2011, 15.43 in January 
2012, and 57.65 in April 2016.  According to the National Cancer Institute, “[i]n general, 
. . . the higher a man’s PSA level, the more likely it is that he has prostate cancer,” and a 
“continuous rise in a man’s PSA level over time may also be a sign of prostate cancer,” 
although there are various factors unrelated to cancer that might cause a man’s PSA to 
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rect[um], and involuntary ejections of waste and blood from his rect[um] and penis.”  
Complaint at ¶ 15. 
 “Prisoners have a right to such information as is reasonably necessary to make an 
informed decision to accept or reject proposed treatment, as well as a reasonable 
explanation of the viable alternative treatments that can be made available in a prison 
setting.”  White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 113 (3d Cir. 1990); see also Pabon v. Wright, 
459 F.3d 241, 249 (2d Cir. 2006) (adopting holding in White).  Further, at the IFP stage, 
courts generally accept the litigant’s claims as true, although “they may in fact be bogus,” 
as “§ 1915(g) is not a vehicle for determining the merits of a claim.”  See Ciarpaglini v. 
Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 330, 331 (7th Cir. 2003); Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 
1055 (9th Cir. 2007) (“We stress at the outset that § 1915(g) concerns only a threshold 
procedural question—whether the filing fee must be paid upfront or later.  Separate 
PLRA provisions are directed at screening out meritless suits early on.  See 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b).”).   
 Brown’s allegations that he has been denied information to allow him to make an 
informed decision, coupled with his allegations of serious medical issues, facially show 
that he was at imminent risk of serious physical injury at the time he filed the complaint.  
See Ibrahim v. District of Columbia, 463 F.3d 3, 6-7 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that a 
serious disease, like Hepatitis C, that could result in serious harm or death, is a “serious  
                                                                                                                                                  
rise.  https://www.cancer.gov/types/prostate/psa-fact-sheet. 
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physical injury”); Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1350 (11th Cir. 2004) (describing 
the failure to treat HIV and hepatitis as causing imminent danger of serious physical 
injury); Vandiver v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 727 F.3d 580, 587 (6th Cir. 2013) 
(incremental harm resulting from failure to treat chronic condition may satisfy § 1915(g) 
standard).  We conclude that the District Court abused its discretion in denying Brown’s 
application to proceed IFP.  
 B.  D.C. Civil No. 16-cv-00627 
 In D.C. Civil No. 16-cv-00627, Brown sought to file a complaint regarding 
medical treatment at SCI-Greene for Hepatitis C. Brown’s complaint states that he had 
previously refused treatment because of the numerous side effects of Interferon treatment.  
Complaint at ¶ 19.  Brown alleges that he then “decided to gamble and accept medical 
treat[ment],” but his “attempts to obtain medical treatment during the past four years . . . 
ha[ve] been flatly denied by Defendants . . . for non-medical reasons.”  Complaint at 
¶¶ 20-21.  The District Court declined to accept Brown’s allegations as true, given his 
frequent complaints about insufficient or inadequate medical care.  Report and 
Recommendation, Dkt. #2, at 5-6.  But while Brown’s allegations in previous cases may 
have been insufficient to show that he was in imminent danger of serious physical injury, 
we conclude that the District Court abused its discretion in this case.   
 Hepatitis C is a serious, potentially fatal disease.  In his complaint, Brown alleges 
that “[a]s a result of the Defendants’ refusal to provide comprehensive, complete, and 
adequate diagnosis and treatment . . . he now suffers from intense recurring pain in the 
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stomach/liver area; progressive weight lost, which has intensified since being housed at 
SCI-Greene, where he has lost approximately 40 lbs since May 11, 2015; and worsening 
symptoms mentioned at paragraph No. 20 (which continues).”5  Complaint ¶ 28.  These 
are not trivial symptoms.  And his allegation that SCI-Greene is refusing him any medical 
treatment for his Hepatitis C, if true, puts Brown in imminent danger of serious physical 
injury.6  The District Court thus abused its discretion in denying Brown’s IFP motion.  
   Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s orders denying 
Brown the privilege of proceeding IFP, and will remand for further proceedings.  We 
express no opinion as to the merit of either of Brown’s complaints. 
 
                                              
5 The symptoms Brown lists in ¶ 20 are “flu-like illness; headaches; indigestion; diarrhea; 
liver pain; frequent urination; night sweats; depression; [and] kidney and urinary tract 
complications.” 
 
6 We take judicial notice that the adequacy of the Pennsylvania Department of 
Corrections’ Hepatitis C Treatment Protocol is at issue in a number of cases.  See, e.g., 
Abu-Jamal v. Wetzel, M.D. Pa. Civ. No. 16-cv-02000, Dkt. #23, Mem. Op., at 30  (Jan. 
3, 2017) (granting preliminary injunction);  Chimenti v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., E.D. Pa. Civ. 
No. 15-cv-03333, Dkt. #26, Mem. Order, at 3-4 (Mar. 21, 2016) (describing allegations 
that treatment protocol operated to deny any treatment to inmates with Hepatitis C 
infections).   
